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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
!'his is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial 
1n,;trict Court, entered on February 15, 1983, the Honorable Jay 
8,1nks presiding, modifying a Decree of Divorce previously 
entered by the same Court on March 4, 1982, the Honorable Larry 
R. Keller presiding. Appellant's appeal is based on the 
Respondent's failure to prove changed circumstances justifying a 
modification of the original Decree of Divorce. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE LOWER COURT 
Pursuant to the Respondent's "Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce", the Third Judicial District Court modified the 
original Decree of Divorce in this matter "to provide that the 
defendant (Appellant herein) pay and keep current any and all 
roast due and unpaid, as well as any and all future monthly 
payments, owed on the $3215.47 Promissory Note ..• " This Order 
was signed by the Honorable Jay E. Banks on February 15, 1983. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
/\ppel lant is seeking a reversal of that portion of the 
the oriqinzll 
February 15, 1983 providing for a modification 
Decree of Divorce signed by the Honorable Larry 
Kc:ller nn March 4, 1982. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 4, 1982, a Decree of Divorce was signed by the 
Honorable Larry R. Keller, dissolving the bonds of matrimon; 
between the Appellant and the Respondent. (R.p.50-53). The trial 
of this case took place on January 18, 1982. ( R. p. 50). Prior to 
the trial and entry of the Decree of Divorce , the Appellant ana 
Respondent (hereinafter referred to as Parties) made 
arrangements to procure a new automobile for the benefit and use 
of the Respondent, To Wit: a 1976 Datsun B210. (R. p. 110-1141, 
The new car was meant as a replacement vehicle for a 1977 
four-wheel drive truck which the Respondent had been driving 
during the pendency of the Parties' divorce. ( R. p.111, 1.4-151. 
The truck was titled in the name of the Appellant. 
(R.p.150 ,l.9-11). On December 18, 1981, the Appellant borrowed 
money from United Bank, and the truck was used as collateral for 
the money borrowed. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-P;R.p.105,1.13-211. 
While the record is not clear as to how much money the Appellant 
borrowed on December 18, 1981, the amount was approximate!/ 
$900.00. to $1000.00. (R.p.108,l.ll-17;p.151,l.ll-16). When 
Appellant Borrowed the money on December 18, 1981, he signed ' 
new promissory note for $3215.47, which sum included the 
additional money borrowed by the Appellant on that date. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-P). On December 18, 1981, the collaterL 
for the loan was the 1977 four-wheel drive lr 11 •• 1 
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iP.p.106,1.6-22). On January 4, 1982, the Respondent signed a 
"'ht:or Vehicle Security Agreement" pledging the 1976 Datsun B210 
3 uL0mobilP as security for a loan of $2300.00. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1-Pl. On the same date, the Respondent signed the 
note that had been previously signed by the Appellant 
on December 18, 1981. (R.p.160,l.15-25;p.161.,1.l-5l. On January 
5, 1982, the Appellant paid $943.18 09 the loan of December 18, 
1981, thereby reducing the amount owed on the loan to 
approximately $2300. 00. (R.p.106,l.20-23;p.162,l.2-4l. The 
Decree of Divorce in this matter awarded the 1976 Datsun to the 
Respondent as property in her possession, but the Decree did not 
order the Appellant to make the car payments on the vehicle. 
(R.p.50-53l .. l\11 of the above transactions occurred before the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce. There is no evidence in the 
record of changed circumstances between the Parties occurring 
after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. (R.p.85-88). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
I\ DECREE OF DIVORCE MAY NOT BE MODIFIED UNLESS THERE IS A 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTIES OCCURRING 
SINCE THE ENTRY OF THE DECREE 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §30-3-5(1)(1953), the trial 
0 •0.1rt in 3. divorce action has "continuing jurisdiction to make 
such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the 
:;urporl and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
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children and their support and maintenance, or tlw distribution 
of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary ... " Ti, 
continuing jurisdiction of the trial court, howeve>r, rlue•, 
grant the trial judge unlimited discretion to modify a rlecre" 
divorce. 
On the contrary, a decree may not be modified, unless tr 
party seeking the modification demonstrates a subsfan,tial change 
of circumstances of the parties occurring subsequent to the 
entry of the decree. In the case of Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d 
1213,1215 (Utah 1983), this Court stated: 
On a petition for modification of a divorce 
decree, the threshold requirement for relief is 
a showing of substantial change in the 
circumstances of the parties occurring since the 
entry of the decree and not contemplated in the 
decree itself ... (cites omitted). 
Further, the burden of proving changed circumstances of the 
parties rests with the party seeking modification of the divorce 
decree. Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 19811; 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978). 
Moreover, the extent of changed circumstances justifying a 
modification of a divorce decree varies with the of 
modification being sought. In the case of Foulgar v. PoulgJr, 
626 P.2d 412,414 (Utah 1981), it was noted that provisions in Jr, 
original decree granting alimony, child support and the l ik,' 
must be readily susceptible to alteration because such needs Jre 
subject to rapid and unpredictable change. But where ti1e cha'1'J' 
relates to the parties' real property, a modification shoul<l 1/ 
-4-
gnnted only upon a showing of compelling reasons arising from a 
s11bstanti.al rind mciterial change of circumstances. Thus the 
11 ature of the modification sought in the case at hand is 
, elcvant in determining whether the. Respondent has sufficiently 
demonstrated changed circumstances justifying modification of 
the Divorce De6ree. Applying the above case law to the facts of 
this case shows tluit the Respondent has failed to meet the 
threshold requirements for a modification of the original 
Divorce Decree. 
First, there is no dispute that all transactions involving 
the four-wheel drive truck and the 1976 Datsun occurred prior to 
the trial and entry of the Decree of Divorce. Thus all the 
circumstances surrounding the vehicles existed at the time of 
trial, and were known to the Parties at the time of the Decree. 
In paragraph 3 of the Decree (R.p.51), the Respondent was 
"awarded and declared to be the sole owner of the following 
property free and clear of any claim of right, title or interest 
of the defendant therein, to wit: ... personal property in her 
possession and control, other than as hereafter set forth." 
Since the Datsun was personal property in the possession and 
control of the Respondent, it was contemplated in the original 
Dr"creP. If the trial court had ordered the Appellant to make the 
on the Datsun, it would have been included in the 
fl et· 
c;"'rond, the Respondent has failed to allege and prove any 
d1unyecl circumstances of the Parties occurring after the entry 
-5-
of the Decree. There is no testimony or evidence in the recGr 
reflecting a change in thP positions of the PartiPs in rc>!,»i 
to each other, let alone the substantial change in circurnstan,, 
contemplated by this Court as a threshold requirement Lor 
divorce decree modification. 
Third, the Respondent's modification deals with the 
division of the Parties' personal property. In Foulgar :!.:._ 
Foulgar, supra, the Utah Supreme Court emphasized the 
importance of the type of modification being sought in relation 
to the nature of the changed circumstances. For instance, a 
modification dealing with real property should only be granted 
UPO!'\ a showing of compelling reasons arising from a substantial 
and material change in circumstances. Although the instant case 
deals with personal property rather than real property, the 
application of the sliding scale set forth in Foulgar would 
indicate that a modification dealing only with personal property 
should not be granted lightly, especially in a case where there 
is no evidence of a substantial and material change in the 
circumstances of the Parties. 
POINT 2 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA PREVENTS THE RESPONDENT FROM 
COLLATERALLY ATTACKING THE DECREE OF DIVOHCE 
In the case of Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 
1090,1091 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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This Court is clearly committed to the 
proposition that in order to modify a prior 
rlecree the moving party must show a substantial 
.:hange of circumstances. In the absence of such 
ci showing, the decree shall not be modified and 
the matters previously litigated and 
incorporated therein cannot be collaterally 
attacked in face of the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
The rule of law stated above from the Kessimakis case is 
directly applicable to the case at hand. Because the Respondent 
has failed to prove any changed circumstances, her "Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce" is nothing more than a collateral 
attack on the original decree. Merely because the Respondent had 
a uni lateral expectation .that the Appellant would make the car 
payments on the Datsun does not entitle her to relitigate the 
Decree. This is especially true in this case where the entire 
divorce between the parties was vigorously contested at all 
stages of the litigation. In such a case it is unreasonable to 
omit an important part of the property distribution 
because that party expected the other party to live up to 
unstated expectations. In fact, the Appellant's testimony is 
directly contradictory to the Respondent's understanding that 
the Appellant would make the car payments. That is, it was the 
understanding of the Appellant that the Respondent would pay the 
$2100.00 owed on the Datsun.IR.p.139,1.20-25). 
The mere fact that the Appellant paid $943 .18 on 
1 iJ, 1 YR l c] 0 ,,,0 not imply that the Appellant believed he was 
!·'.;!"''' ;1Lile to the Respondent for the car payments. Because 'the 
,, 1•pc11a·1 t had borrowed approximately the same amount of m?ney 
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for a purpose other than purchasing thP vehicle, the Appel lar:r 
was simply paying back the excess money he hod borrowed fur I.:,, 
extraneous purpose. Regardless, the origin<1l !JccreP dirJ r .. · 
order the Appellant to make the payments on the Datsun, and t·,, 
Respondent is barred by the doctrine of res judicata frorr, 
collaterally attacking the Decree. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Respondent failed to prove substantially 
changed circumstances occurring after the entry of the Divorce 
Decree, she failed to meet the threshold requirement for a 
modification of the original Decree. Further, she is , 
collaterally es topped from reli tigating the property settlement 
merely because of her unilateral understanding at the time of 
the original Decree. Therefore, the decision of the trial court 
modifying the Decree of Divorce should be reversed, and the 
Respondent's "Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" should be 
dismissed for failure to prove a substantial change in 
circumstances. 
Respectfully submitted day of June, 1984. 
McINTYRE, DENNIS & 
Kerry P. Eagan, Attorney for 
Appellant 
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